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Abstract: A large literature has studied the effect of displacement on labor market 
outcomes in general, but none has evaluated how the displaced manage as self-employed. 
This paper studies how the survival of the business is affected by displacement in 
connection to entry, using a discrete-time proportional hazard model on a matched 
sample of displaced and non-displaced individuals. The main result of the paper is that, as 
a consequence of previous displacement, the probability of switching from self-
employment to paid employment decreases and the probability of switching to 
unemployment is unaffected. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Extensive worker displacements have become a common reality in Western societies in 
the last few decades. As the phenomenon has become increasingly frequent, the literature 
on the subject has grown quite large. Several papers have studied the individual's cost of 
worker displacement by estimating earning losses, spells and duration of unemployment. 
The papers typically find that displaced workers face less favorable conditions on the 
labor market, with more frequent and longer spells of unemployment and smaller 
earnings. In response to the tougher conditions following displacement, Nykvist (2008) 
finds that the probability of self-employment is increased. Although a large literature has 
evaluated the impact of displacement on the labor market in general, no one has 
evaluated how the displaced succeed as self-employed. 
    In this paper, I attempt to answer the question of whether the survival of a firm is 
affected by previous displacement. Based on the previously presented evidence of a less 
favorable position on the labor market, the displaced should be expected to remain longer 
in self-employment since the outside options are worse. As a consequence of 
displacement, however, individuals with an average lower entrepreneurial ability might 
select into self-employment, since a lower reservation wage implies that lower 
entrepreneurial ability is sufficient for self-employment to yield the highest utility. This 
mechanism possibly counteracts the positive effect on survival. The effects of 
displacement on survival are hence expected to go both via a direct effect of worse 
outside options but also via an indirect effect, stemming from a different selection into 
self-employment. 
    To identify the effect of displacement on survival, propensity score matching is 
incorporated in order to create a matched sample of displaced and non-displaced 
individuals. Then, a duration analysis is conducted on those individuals from the matched 
sample who select into self-employment. A discrete-time proportional hazard model 
indicates that the survival of the business is increased as a consequence of displacement. 
However, the effect is heterogenous with respect to whether the individuals leave self-
employment for unemployment, employment or inactivity.
3 The results indicate that 
displacement decreases the probability of leaving self-employment for employment and 
that the probability of leaving self-employment for unemployment and inactivity is 
unaffected. The effect on exits to inactivity is very uncertain, however. 
    The data used in the paper contain all individuals in Sweden who have been displaced 
due to plant closures or downsizing during 1987 and 1988 (271,873 individuals). In 
addition, it includes a control group consisting of 200,000 individuals who are employed 
in 1986. The information in the data is extensive. It includes individual and family 
background, labor market history as well as regional characteristics for each individual at 
least three years prior to and eleven years after potential displacement. The large sample 
size and the rich information make it possible to use a matched sample, which implies 
that I can control for selection into displacement without controlling for selection into 
                                                 
3 Inactivity refers to the individual having left the labor force. 
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self-employment (selection into self-employment is part of what I want to capture). A 
further advantage of the data is the long follow-up period. 
    The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related literature and a 
theoretical framework are briefly discussed. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and 
the data are described in Section 4. The empirical analysis is found in Section 5 and 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2  Related literature and a theoretical framework 
 
In previous literature, displacement is typically found to persistently decrease the wage in 
future employment (Hamermesh, 1987; Edin, 1988; Jacobson et al., 1993; Huff Stevens, 
1997; Eliason, 2005; Huttunen et al., 2006). For instance, Eliason (2005), who uses the 
same data set as this paper, finds that the income for married employed men decreases by 
5 percent immediately after displacement, that earning losses are the largest (11 percent) 
after 6 years and that earning losses are as large as 7.5 percent even after 11 years. A 
commonly raised explanation for the earning losses is the loss of firm-specific human 
capital. Other suggested explanations for earning losses are the loss of particularly good 
matches between individuals' human capital and the firm, the existence of wage 
premiums and the acceptance of lower present wages in return for higher earnings later in 
the same employment. Displaced individuals have also been found to have longer and 
more frequent spells of unemployment, both in the short and the long run (Huff Stevens, 
1997; Eliason and Storrie, 2006). Both unemployment and decreased wage in 
employment imply a lower reservation wage of self-employment. Displacement may also 
have non-pecuniary effects decreasing the reservation wage for self-employment. For 
instance, Shapero (1975) argues that displacement creates bitterness and insulted feelings, 
which increases the preferences for being one's own boss. 
    In an occupational choice framework, a decreased reservation wage of self-
employment implies an increased probability of entry. Evidence consistent with this 
mechanism is provided in Nykvist (2008) which finds that displacement almost doubles 
the probability of self-employment entry. Hence, more individuals seem to select into 
self-employment due to displacement. The next question is then, what are the 
consequences for survival? As modeled by, for instance, Jovanovic (1994), the entry 
decision depends on expected entrepreneurial ability and the pay-off (and hence survival) 
in self-employment is determined by realized entrepreneurial ability.
4 This implies that if 
displaced and non-displaced have similar expectations, the displaced will on average 
have a lower entrepreneurial ability and will thus fail to a larger extent. Hence, as an 
indirect effect of displacement, which works via selection into self-employment, the 
failure rate is expected to be higher among the displaced. An expected counteracting 
effect on self-employment survival stems from the presumed persistency in the decrease 
in labor income and increased preferences for self-employment following displacement; 
self-employment is to a larger extent the best occupational choice for the displaced, not 
                                                 
4 Entrepreneurial ability can be considered as the ability to run a business and find profitable business 
opportunities which, as suggested by Casson (2003), might reflect judgement. 
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only when entering self-employment, but also when the choice is revised as time elapses, 
everything else equal. 
    The literature on self-employment survival is, in general, sparse.
5 Most closely related, 
Carrasco (1999) and Johansson (2000) find that being unemployed before entry into self-
employment increases the exit rate to unemployment, which they explain by a lower 
entrepreneurial ability due to a lower reservation wage for job-less individuals. While 
there is no effect of being job-less on the exit rate to employment according to Johansson 
(2000), Carrasco (1999) finds a positive effect also in this respect. Taylor (1999) studies 
the same issue from the employment side and, consistently with Carrasco (1999), finds 
that individuals who have left employment for self-employment (i.e. quit their jobs before 
entry) survive longer as self-employed, independently of exit state. While these studies 
provide a descriptive analysis of the differences in self-employment survival between 
previously unemployed and employed individuals, this paper will capture the causal 




3  Empirical strategy 
 
There are two potential selection processes of importance for the analysis, selection into 
displacement and selection into self-employment. While I want to capture the latter to 
apprehend differences in entrepreneurial ability, the first needs to be random to enable 
identification. To make identification possible, a two step procedure is applied. In the 
first step, I create a matched sample of displaced and non-displaced individuals and then, 
in the second step, I perform a duration analysis on those who select into self-
employment from this matched sample.
6 The identifying assumption is that displacement 
is randomly assigned in the matched sample. 
    The matched sample is constructed using the propensity score, as proposed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985). The probability of displacement (the propensity score) is 
estimated using a logit model on all displaced and non-displaced individuals (see Section 
4.3 for a description of the estimation of the propensity score). The goal is to create a 
propensity score such that displacement is independently assigned conditional on the 
propensity score (the conditional independence assumption).
7 If conditional 
independence is achieved, the non-displaced individual with an identical propensity score 
represents the counterfactual of the displaced and the effect of displacement can hence be 
identified. All variables jointly affecting survival and probability of displacement should 
be included in the propensity score for the assumption to be fulfilled. For each displaced 
                                                 
5 For a recent review of the literature on self-employment survival, see Georgellis et al. (2005). 
 
6 For a similar approach using a discrete time proportional hazard model on a matched sample, see Hujer et 
al. (1998). 
 
7 As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), assuming that outcome is independent of treatment 
assignment conditional on the propensity score (Y(0),Y(1)┴D|p(X)) is equivalent to assuming that outcome 
is independent of treatment assignment conditional on the controls (Y(0),Y(1) ┴D|X). 
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individual, the non-displaced individual with the closest propensity score is then assigned 
and all pairs together constitute the matched sample. 
    From the matched sample, those selecting into self-employment in the year of potential 
displacement are picked out and a duration analysis is then carried out on this sub-
sample. As compared to studying the individuals selecting into displacement the year 
after displacement, using the year of displacement maximizes the follow-up period and 
avoids selection of displaced individuals who enter reluctantly due to the lack of other 
options. Choosing the longest possible follow-up period is especially important 
considering that some uncertainty enters in the middle of the period due to lacking 
information in the data (this problem will be discussed in detail in Section 4.1). Using the 
year of potential displacement also ensures that the control group really consists of 
employed individuals. Since I cannot observe when in the year the exit occurred, self-
employment entry can occur both before and after actual displacement. Based on the fact 
that prior displacements are arguably known at least in the same year as that in which the 
individuals will lose their jobs, entries both before and after can be regarded as effects of 
displacement. Since all individuals in the sample enter self-employment, flow sampling is 
employed which implies that left censoring is not an issue. 
    In the second step, entrepreneurial survival is estimated using the discrete-time 
proportional hazard model developed in Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) which uses a 
complementary log-log specification to model the hazard function. A discrete model is 
used since the data do not allow identifying at what point in time during the year the exit 
occurred. The discrete-time hazard is the probability of failure in [ta-1, ta) divided by the 
probability of surviving until at least ta-1. The model is the discrete representation of the 
proportional hazard model and resembles the Cox proportional hazard model in the sense 
that it does not make any assumptions about the baseline hazard. The estimates have the 
same interpretation as in continuous time; for small changes in the covariates, the 
coefficients are good approximations of the percentage effect on the hazard and for 
dummy variables, the percentage effect on the hazard is 100(e
β-1). The shape of the 
baseline hazard is non-parametrically estimated by including dummy variables for each 
duration interval.  
    All exits are not failures and the mechanisms behind the exit may differ considerably. 
To make a closer identification of the effects of displacement possible, exit states defined 
as employment status after self-employment exit are used. The exit states employment, 
unemployment and inactivity are considered. Based on assumed worse outside options 
following displacement, the hazard rate should be decreased by displacement when 
considering the employment exit state. However, since exits to employment may reflect 
both voluntary and involuntary exits, a positive effect is also possible and in line with the 
theoretical framework (based on the selection of less able individuals). Since exiting to 
unemployment is arguably almost exclusively involuntary, displacement is expected to 
increase the hazard rate when instead considering this exit state. The interpretation of the 
exit state inactivity is less clear, which I will return to later. By assuming the competing 
risks to be independent of each other, single-risk methods can be separately applied to 
each exit state. In each of the competing risk models, the options are hence either to 
continue (right censored) or to exit into the exit state in question. 
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4  Data and descriptive analysis 
 
The data are longitudinal and follow displaced and non-displaced individuals during the 
years 1983-1999. The information in the data is extensive. At the individual level, the 
data set covers information on basic demographics, family, education, material welfare, 
labor market, region, work and health. It also consists of aggregated regional labor 
market information. The data include all individuals in Sweden who were displaced due 
to plant closures or downsizing in 1987 or 1988 (271,873 individuals). In addition, a 
random sample of 200,000 individuals employed in an establishment that is not closing or 
downsizing in November 1986 are included.
8 
    The sample is restricted to include non-self-employed individuals aged 25 to 55 (the 
year before potential displacement) in order to exclude individuals close to retirement and 
those close to or still in secondary or tertiary education. The sample further excludes 
individuals in the construction industry and individuals with missing information 
concerning industry. The former restriction is implemented since in the construction 
industry, establishments are mobile and connected to building sites implying that it is 
difficult to accurately define establishments and hence, displacements. The latter 
restriction is implemented to avoid selection issues, which may arise since only the non-
displaced have missing information on industry (the displaced without information 




4.1  Self-employment and exit states 
 
A self-employed is defined as an individual who has reported to the tax authority that she 
has received income as a sole proprietor or from a trading partnership and that she carries 
the business and works at least 33 percent out of full time in it (i.e. the individual is 
regarded as an active owner by the Swedish tax authority). Exit from self-employment is 
identified by the disappearance of the business income, where the year of exit is the last 
year in which the individual receives business income. As previously indicated, the self-
employed are divided into the exit states employment, unemployment and inactivity. 
Unemployed are defined as individuals who have received unemployment benefits in the 
                                                 
8 The register based Labor Market Statistics (RAMS) were used to identify the displaced workers and the 
control group. RAMS also contains register based information about the individuals. Further information 
about individual characteristics was collected from the Income and Wealth register (IoF) for the years 
1983-1989 and the corresponding information for the years 1990-1999 was collected from the Longitudinal 
Database of Education, Income and Employment (LOUISE). Classification of the municipalities based on 
structural characteristics was obtained from the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions 
(The latest available classification was used which is strictly valid for 1988 to 1992. There should be no 
large differences compared to a potential classification for the years used in this study, that is 1985 to 
1987). Regional unemployment data is based on registered unemployment from the local labor market 
authorities. 
 
9 The attrition is 4.3 percent for the sample period. In addition to the attrition, some individuals have 
missing values for some intermediate periods. These individuals are also excluded and correspond to an 
additional 0.5 percent. 
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year of exit;
10 employed are defined as individuals who have received labor income and 
not unemployment benefits in the year of exit; and inactive individuals have neither 
received unemployment benefits nor labor income. 
    A shortcoming of the data is that owners of limited companies or individuals who are 
passive sole proprietors or passive owners of trading partnership cannot be identified. 
This implies that these business owners are excluded and that I cannot capture changes in 
legal organizational form or degree of activity. While disregarding the passive business 
owners and defining passive ownership as exit is rational and in line with previous 
research (see, for instance, Bates (1990)), the owners of limited companies should not be 
excluded and incorporating the business should not be regarded as exit. Fortunately, the 
exclusion is not very large since the large majority of new businesses in Sweden have the 
legal organizational form of sole proprietor or trading partnerships. Those individuals 
who change this legal organizational form to a limited company will be captured in the 
inactivity or employment category. All business incorporations before 1990 will be 
captured in the inactivity exit state. After the 1990-tax reform, the imposed income-
splitting rules imply that to which of the states they are designated depends on whether 
they receive labor income from their limited company or not. Since businesses of interest 
for incorporation are likely to exceed the limit for when income must be declared as labor 
income, a large share will end up in the latter category. The exit states employment and 
inactivity will hence not only capture exits but also incorporations. However, it is 
reasonable to believe that potential differences in the probability of incorporating 
between displaced and non-displaced individuals will not drive the results, since only a 
small share of the sole proprietors and trading partnerships incorporate.
11 
    A related complicating issue is to which exit state individuals who sell a successful 
business are designated. Since these individuals may receive unemployment benefits after 
an extended qualifying period, they may end up in all exit states. This problem is 
particularly unfortunate since it implies that exits to unemployment cannot exclusively be 
regarded as failures. If, for some reason, the non-displaced exploit unemployment 
benefits after selling a successful business to a larger extent than the displaced, the effect 
of displacement from the assumed lower entrepreneurial ability is counteracted. Another 
problem associated with the definition of the exit state is that individuals who leave the 
business in December may falsely be designated to the inactivity exit state since these 
individuals may not receive the first wage or unemployment benefits until the subsequent 
year. The problem should be more prevalent among those who enter employment, since 
unemployment benefits are received with only, at most, a six-day qualifying period.
12 It is 
also important to note that for exits in the first duration interval (individuals who enter 
and exit in the same year), the exit state could equally well be labor status before entry. 
By the definition of the control group, it is impossible for the non-displaced to be 
                                                 
10 All business owners are entitled to unemployment benefits from a basic insurance scheme, at the time 
handled by KAS. 
 
11 While 22 percent of the newly established businesses in 1999 were corporations, 27 percent of the 
existing businesses were corporations (based on data from the Swedish Institute for Growth Policy Studies 
(ITPS) and Statistics Sweden). 
 
12 Between 1989 and 1993 there was no qualifying period. 
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regarded as entering inactivity in the first year. Due to this drawback, the effect of 
displacement in the first duration interval is separated from the total in some parts of the 
analysis. In the robustness analysis, unemployment benefits and labor incomes are, 
furthermore, measured in the year after exit. While this definition does not imply any 
problems in correctly designating those leaving in December or that the entry status 
rather than the exit status is measured, it may actually not capture the exit state since the 
employment status may have changed. 
 
 
Self-employment in 1990 
 
A problem with the data is the lack of information on business income in 1990. This is 
due to the fact that up until 1990, RAMS contains the business income for the year of 
declaration instead of the year of income (implying that business income refers to 
business income in the prior year) but then refers to the year of income. To make a 
duration analysis covering both the period before and after 1990 possible, some kind of 
imputation of whether the individual is self-employed in 1990 is necessary. In the main 
part of the paper, the self-employment status in 1990 is estimated using conditional 
probabilities exploiting the fact that the displaced have different years of entry and hence, 
1990 occurs in different duration intervals. The probability of exit in a certain duration 
interval is calculated for the displaced (with information), separately for sub-sequent self-
employed and non-self-employed. Those displaced individuals lacking information in the 
duration interval in question are then randomly assigned a self-employment status with 
the probability calculated in the previous step and conditional on the self-employment 
status in the following period. The method is straightforward for the displaced and should 
yield good approximations at the macro level if the displaced do not differ significantly 
among each other. For the non-displaced, it might be less obvious to use the probability 
of self-employment for the displaced, but it is inevitable since all non-displaced lack 
information on exits in duration interval 4 (the self-employment status is missing in 
period 5). The approach is expected to decrease the difference between the displaced and 
the non-displaced. Since exits in one duration interval affect all subsequent exits (since 
the individual can only exit once), all duration intervals following 1990 might also be 
affected. It is also important to note that, due to an insufficient number of observations, 
no consideration in terms of exit states is taken when calculating the conditional 
probabilities. This implies that although the share of observations of exits in 1990 will be 
correct, it might give misleading results when considering the exit states. Due to these 
concerns, the effects of displacement will be studied separately in each duration interval 
in predicted-hazard-graphs after the baseline regressions. Two other approaches are used 
in the robustness section to give self-employment status to those lacking information. In 
the first case, all individuals attain the same status as in the following year (1991) and in 
the second case, all individuals attain the self-employment status in the prior year (1989). 
The first case implies that no firm deaths occur in 1991 while in the second case, no firm 
deaths occur in 1989. 
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4.2  Identifying the displaced 
 
The displaced in the paper include individuals displaced both due to plant closure and 
downsizing. Plant closure is the cleanest measure of displacement since selection on 
personal characteristics is minimized. Downsizing is included in the definition to extend 
the sample size, which is crucial for the use of a matched sample. 
    Let me start with the definition of individuals displaced due to plant closures. A closed 
establishment is first identified by the disappearance of its identity number from the 
compulsory annual payroll tax returns. All closures affecting at least ten employees were 
identified.
13 Excluding small plants implies that selection stemming from the fact that 
less able employees might increase the probability of failure and hence, closure, should 
be negligible. On the other hand, if individuals employed in small plants to a larger extent 
obtain entrepreneurial knowledge from their employer than individuals in large plants, 
the exclusion of small plants implies that the effect of displacement on hazard might be 
positively biased. 
    The longitudinal features of the data make it possible to define closure as a process 
over time and hence, to define displaced workers as those separating from the 
establishment within a certain time-window preceding the closure. If individuals who 
leave early differ from those who stay until the end, this is important since omitting the 
early leavers would bias the results.
14 A disadvantage with the wider time window, 
pointed out by Kuhn (2002), is the risk of including normal workforce turnover. Eliason 
(2005) minimizes this risk by first setting an upper limit equal to three calendar years for 
the closure process and then, after careful inspection of each process, a probable duration 
of the process is defined to be one, two or three years, based on worker flows and 
establishment size.
15 In this paper, the same definition of displaced workers is used as in 
Eliason (2005), that is, all separations that occurred within the time-window of the 
closure process determined for the particular establishment.
16 
    Individuals are defined as displaced due to downsizing if separating from a plant (in 
1987 or 1988) where the labor force is reduced by at least 20 percent during the year. A 
potential concern when using this definition is that the exits might not refer to 
displacements but rather to voluntary quits. This concern is more serious when 
considering downsizing, as compared to plant closures, since there is no information on 
whether the firm actually displaces employees. 20 percent of the work force may leave a 
plant during the same year without its having anything to do with downsizing. This is 
                                                 
13 These establishments were surveyed by Statistics Sweden to ensure that the disappearance of the identity 
number was actually due to closure. This procedure mitigates the problem of identifying "false firm deaths" 
discussed by Kuhn (2002). 
 
14 Previous studies on displacement have in general neglected the fact that closure is a process over time. 
Two exceptions that use a wider time-window including early leavers are Hamermesh and Pfann (2001) 
and Huttunen et al. (2006). 
 
15 For a closer description, see Appendix A. 
 
16 Since RAMS is only available from the year 1985, workers displaced three years prior to closures in 
1987 are not identified in the data. 
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especially true in smaller plants. Moreover, even if they are downsizing, the risk is larger 
that some individuals might quit voluntary if the plant is only downsizing and not closing 
down. A further concern is that the firm might select whom to displace based on 
productivity or other unobservable characteristics. Considering the restrictive seniority 
rules applied in Sweden, this selection should not be too severe, however. Due to the 
concerns associated with the definition of displaced due to downsizing, robustness checks 




4.3  Control variables and creating a matched sample 
 
All time-variant variables at the micro level included in the estimation of the propensity 
score are measured three years prior to potential displacement (see Table 1) to minimize 
the risk of the pre-displacement information being affected by the impending 
displacement. Since the number of displaced is larger than the number of non-displaced, 
the non-displaced are allowed to be used as matches several times (i.e. matching with 
replacement). Using replacement also minimizes a potential bias. A concern in our 
particular case associated with using matching with replacement is that the weight on 
some individuals might become large and create a large variance in the duration analysis. 
Only the nearest neighbor is used in order to achieve the smallest possible bias. In 
general, using only one neighbor as compared to oversampling reduces the bias but also 
reduces the efficiency. Abadie and Imbens (2006) establish that in the case of a fixed 
number of neighbors and matching with replacement, the potential gains in terms of 
variance associated with using multiple neighbors are negligible as compared to the 
losses in terms of bias. Nevertheless, five neighbors will be used as robustness. Finally, to 
restrict the sample to only contain individuals within the common support, only those 
treated for which the closest match is within one percent of the propensity score are 
considered. 
    In an attempt at creating a propensity score fulfilling the conditional independence 
assumption, interactions and polynomials of the covariates in Table 1 are included in the 
propensity score until there are no significant differences (at the 1 percent level) in the 
covariate means between the displaced and non-displaced in the matched sample. The 
standardized bias in the matched sample is reduced from 6.11 to 0.379.
17 Due to the 
common support restriction, one treated individual is disregarded. This small loss implies 
that the common support is close to complete and hence, that the effects can be 
generalized to all displaced individuals. To further evaluate the balance of the propensity 
score, the approach of Dehejia and Wahba (1999), (2002) is applied. This approach 
involves studying the equality of the means for the treated and untreated for different 
deciles of the propensity score. For the final propensity score, the balance in each decile 
of the propensity score is above 75 percent in all 8 middle deciles. 
    In Table 1, the means and standard errors for the pre-displacement variables, used to 
estimate the propensity score, are presented for non-displaced and displaced individuals. 
For the non-displaced, the means in both the unmatched and matched sample are 
                                                 
17 The standardized bias is calculated as D=(x-takD-x-takC)/√((sD²+sS²)). 
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presented. The matched sample now refers to those individuals from the whole matched 
sample who have selected into self-employment. 
    It is clear from Table 1 that in most cases, the differences between the displaced and 
non-displaced are smaller when considering the means in the matched sample, as 
compared to the unmatched sample. However, there are clear differences between the 
displaced and non-displaced also for the matched sample. Since there are no differences 
in the covariate means in the whole matched sample, this suggests that differences 
between the displaced and non-displaced exist both due to pre-displacement differences 
and due to the selection into self-employment. 
    In addition to the dummy variable indicating displacement, all duration analysis 
regressions will include the local unemployment rate and local average aggregated 
income as time-varying variables to control for environmental conditions.
18 In addition, 
one specification will include the year of entry. The intention with this inclusion is to 
control for macro effects potentially not controlled for by the local unemployment rate 
and average aggregated income, but since only the displaced enter in different years (all 
non-displaced entered in 1987), the dummy variables for the year of entry might be 
driven by differences between early and late leavers among the displaced. Since only 
individuals displaced due to downsizing enter in 1987, the dummy variables might 





                                                 
18 The environmental controls refer to the conditions (over time) in the residential municipality the year of 
entry. The individuals are thus assumed not to move. 




4.4  Life table estimates 
 
In this section, life table estimates are presented for displaced and non-displaced. In 
Table 2, Kaplan-Meier survivor function estimates are presented together with the 
number of observations, right censored observations and firm deaths in each duration 
interval. 
   As can be seen in Table 2, survival clearly differs between the displaced and non-
displaced while the differences are negligible between the unmatched and matched 
sample of non-displaced. According to a log-ratio test of the equality of the survivor 
functions, the displaced and non-displaced differ for both the matched and non-matched 
sample, while there is no difference between the non-displaced in the matched and non-
matched sample. A substantially larger share of the firms survive the first year for 
displaced individuals compared to the non-displaced and only 3 to 4 percent of the firms 
survive eleven years for the non-displaced as compared to 8 percent for the displaced. 
The number of survivors decreases dramatically in the first years and then the decline 
diminishes.   12
 
    As described in Section 4.1, the exits in duration intervals 2, 3 and 4 are partly 
estimated for the displaced. For the non-displaced, all exits in duration interval 4 are 
estimated. This implies that the largest uncertainty is in duration interval 4, where both 
non-displaced and displaced have estimated exits and the largest share of the estimated 
exits occur. As previously indicated, however, also exits after these intervals are affected 
if the "wrong" individuals exit. 
 
 
5  Empirical results 
 
5.1  Baseline results 
 
In this section, the effect of displacement on self-employment survival will be estimated 
using a discrete-time proportional hazard model on the matched sample (see Section 3 for 
a description of the empirical method). Both a single risk and a competing risks 
framework are considered. Specifications with and without the year of entry are used. 
The results are presented in Table 3.   
    For the single risk model, the result suggests that the risk of exiting is decreased as a 
consequence of displacement. The effect of displacement crucially depends on the exit 
state, however. While the risk of exiting to employment is significantly decreased, the 
risk of exiting to unemployment or inactivity is increased, although insignificantly in 
most of the cases. The effect of the local unemployment rate is as expected. Increased 
unemployment in the residential municipality implies an increased risk of exiting to 
unemployment and a decreased risk of exiting to employment. The local aggregated 
average income decreases the risk of exit to both unemployment and employment, but is 
significantly stronger when considering exits to unemployment. For the exit state 
inactivity, both the local average income and the local unemployment rate are 
insignificant, which may reflect the potentially large diversity in this exit state. The 
estimated coefficients for the year of entry indicate that the later the firm is started, the 




unemployment (considering the significant effects). Based on the heavily weakening 
economic trend in 1990, the opposite result was expected. The result may instead be 
driven by selection among the displaced, as discussed in Section 4.3. The displaced in 
1986, who are all displaced due to plant closure and have left the firm early (one or two 
years prior to closure), seem to have worse outside options and lower entrepreneurial 
ability as compared to the other displaced. Due to the fact that the result indicates that the 
year of entry mainly reflects differences between the displaced and not, as intended, 
different effects of the bust in 1990, and since I am only interested in capturing an 
average effect for all displaced, in the rest of the paper I will entirely focus on the 
specifications without the year of entry. Thus, I rely on the fact that the local 
unemployment rate and average income will capture differences in economic 
environment. Using the year of entry would, in these circumstances, be inconsistent since 
the propensity score is estimated for all displaced and not separately estimated for the 
displaced in the different years. 
    I will now return to the effects of displacement and analyze these in more detail. For 
the exit state employment, the risk of exiting is decreased by approximately 22 percent 
(100(e
-.245-1)) as a consequence of displacement (according to the specification excluding 
the year of entry). The longer survival is expected based on displacement implying worse 
outside options. Due to the inability to identify owners of corporations, the result may 
also reflect the fact that non-displaced incorporate to a larger extent. Based on the 
assumed lower entrepreneurial ability among the displaced, this may indeed be the case 
since arguably the most successful businesses incorporate. As previously argued, 
however, the number of business incorporations is small, which implies that the above 
result plausibly mainly reflects worse outside options. The result indicates that the   14
displaced view self-employment as their new means of subsistence, rather than as a 
transitory state between employments, which can be interpreted as self-employment 
being a means of getting away from paid employment rather than back to employment. 
For the exit state unemployment, a positive sign is expected based on the introductory 
theoretical reasoning. Displacement was argued to imply an average lower 
entrepreneurial ability among those who select into self-employment, which should imply 
a higher failure rate. The magnitude of the effect is small and insignificant, however, and 
the evidence in favor of this reasoning is hence weak. As previously indicated, the exit 
state may contain exits due to sales of profitable businesses. That differences between 
displaced and non-displaced in the propensity to exploit unemployment benefits after 
selling a profitable business would affect the result (and counteract a potential effect from 
lower entrepreneurial ability) indeed seems unreasonable, however. 
     Displacement significantly increases the hazard rate into inactivity for the 
specification excluding the year of entry. An interpretation in line with the assumed lower 
entrepreneurial ability and the worse outside options is that the displaced fail to a larger 
extent and leave the labor force due to worse outside options. Those who enter self-
employment and then leave self-employment for inactivity among the displaced may be 
individuals determined to not once more fall under the control of others but who lack 
sufficient entrepreneurial ability to remain in self-employment. As previously described, 
however, the inactivity exit state may also contain incorporations and sales of profitable 
companies. If the displaced are more determined and focused (more full-time self-
employment)
19 on being self-employed, it is reasonable to believe that they will 
incorporate the business to a larger extent, since incorporations are commonly associated 
with expansion. Based on the worse outside options, it is also plausible that after selling a 
profitable business, the displaced leave the labor force to a larger extent than the non-
displaced. The latter two explanations give an intuition for a positive effect on the hazard 
rate without any connection to entrepreneurial ability. 
    As previously discussed, the exit state for the first duration interval may not be the exit 
state but rather the entry state and for the non-displaced, exits to inactivity are, by 
definition, impossible. When separating the effect of displacement in the first year from 
the total effect (an interaction between displaced and the first duration interval dummy 
variable is included), the signs are still the same but now the effect is insignificant, not 
only in the unemployment exit state but also for the other two exit states. For the exit 
state employment, the magnitude of the effect is heavily decreased to 0.07. That the first 
duration interval drives the result is not surprising based on the fact that it is reasonable to 
believe that potential differences are largest before those less suited or motivated to be 
self-employed are sorted out, but is worrying considering the problems in knowing 
whether the exit states really indicate the labor status after exit. However, it seems 
implausible that a larger share of the displaced, as compared to the non-displaced, who 
leave self-employment after the first year receives labor income and not unemployment 
benefits before entry and that this difference would drive the result. If anything, the 
opposite would be expected and hence decrease the estimated effect. Furthermore, it 
should be kept in mind that the single risk model also indicates a negative effect on the 
                                                 
19 The year after entry, 70 percent of the displaced are part-time self-employed and 94 percent of the non-
displaced are part-time self-employed (i.e. they have labor income in addition to business income). 
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hazard, which indicates that displaced do survive longer (this effect is also insignificant if 
excluding the first year). The uncertainty only concerns from which exit state this 
increased survival can be extracted and, based on the results, the only reasonable 
conclusion is that it originates from the employment exit state. For the inactivity exit 
state, on the other hand, the result totally eliminates any reliability of the previous results. 
In the rest of the paper, I will continue to report the results for inactivity but not comment 
on them due to this result and the difficulties in finding a meaningful interpretation. As a 
final remark, it is evident from studying the sample sizes in the different exit states that 
the large majority of all exits end since the individual enters employment. This finding is 
consistent with the result of Taylor (1999). 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the expected hazard for the specifications excluding the year of entry. 
The first impression from the figure is that there is a clear negative duration dependence; 
that is, the risk of exit is decreasing the longer is the period in which the individual has 
been self-employed. The result of negative duration dependence is consistent with 
previous empirical evidence (see, for instance, Evans and Leighton (1989); Taylor 
(1999); Carrasco (1999)). The risk of exiting to unemployment seems to be exponentially 
decreasing with the years in self-employment. Between the first and fourth year, the risk 
of exit decreases drastically from roughly 10 to 3 percent. There is less variation in the 
risk of exiting self-employment for employment but the risk still decreases substantially 
between the first and eleventh year. Except for the peak in self-employment in the fifth 
year, the risk of exiting to employment is continuously decreasing.  
   Figure 2 provides the predicted hazard using different baseline hazards for the 
displaced and the non-displaced. This figure is especially informative since it might 
contribute more information about whether the effects are purely driven by the first 
duration interval. Different baseline hazards are obtained by including interactions 
between the duration interval dummy variables and displacement in addition to the   16
  
 
negative duration dependence although the relationship between time and hazard for non-
displaced is sometimes shaky. As discussed in Section 4.3, the latter can be explained by 
the fact that each non-displaced can be used several times in the matched sample and 
hence, some observations get a large weight. Nevertheless, for exits to employment, the 
predicted hazard is in most cases smaller for the displaced. The interaction term is 
significantly negative for the first, second, fifth, sixth, and eighth duration intervals. The 
only significant interaction term indicating a larger hazard for the displaced is the 
interaction for the third duration interval. That the hazard is smaller for the displaced in 
the majority of the time intervals indicates that displaced individuals really do leave self-
employment for employment to a smaller extent, not only in the first duration interval. 
For unemployment, the differences are never significant and there is no clear pattern. 
    A striking feature of Figure 2 is that there are no non-displaced exits to unemployment 
in duration interval 5, while a large number of individuals leave for employment. The 
same pattern could be discerned in the previous figure. This implies that none of the 
displaced who receive unemployment benefits in 1991 have self-employment income in 
1990 but not in 1991. This might be due to the self-employment status not being correctly 
assigned in 1990 for those without business income in 1991 and hence, some of the non-
displaced who should have exited in duration interval 4 instead exit in duration interval 5 
(they have received self-employment status 1 instead of 0 in duration interval 4). This 
highlights the problems which follow from the conditional probabilities not being 
conditioned on exit states. 
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5.2  Robustness analysis
20 
 
In this section, the sensitivity of the baseline result will be studied. I will completely 
focus on the competing risks framework and the specifications excluding the year of 
entry. As indicated before, I will also only report but not comment on the results for the 
exit state inactivity. To start with, I will use the alternative methods for interpolation of 
the self-employment status in 1990. The result can be seen in Table 4.  
 
 
    As can be seen, the results are very similar to those in the baseline regression. Once 
more, the risk of exiting to employment is significantly decreased by displacement, while 
the risk of exiting to unemployment is insignificant. This result indicates that the 
estimation of 1990 does not drive the baseline results. The next robustness concerns the 
employment status in the year following exit, instead of in the year of exit. The result can 
be seen in Table 5. 
    Thus, the risk of exiting to employment is decreased by displacement. This result is 
ensuring based on the inability to know whether the exit state really refers to labor status 
after exit for the first duration interval. It should convince the still doubting reader about 
there being no differences in the entry state that drive the effect for the exit state 
employment. The result also indicates that misspecifications of the exit state for 
individuals exiting in December do not have any important effect on the results. The 
effect is still insignificant for the unemployment exit state, but now the sign is negative. It 
is interesting to note that the risk of exiting to inactivity is now insignificant, which 
supports the view that the effect of displacement in the baseline regression is spurious. 
    As a next robustness check, 5 instead of 1 neighbor is used to create the matched      
sample. Since there are differences in two of the covariate means in the matched sample 
for the baseline propensity score when considering 5 neighbors, the propensity score is 
                                                 
20 Empirical results, not presented in the section, are available upon request. 
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re-estimated. The result using the baseline propensity score is presented for comparability 








    In Table 6, the hazard coefficient for displacement is significantly negative for the 
employment exit state and significantly positive for the unemployment exit state, for both 
the re-estimated and the baseline propensity score. Hence, the results are in line with the 
previous ones but the effect in the unemployment exit state is now significant. The size of 
                                                 
21 There are no differences in covariate means in the re-estimated propensity score. The standardized bias is 
0.362 and no observations are off the common support. In the baseline propensity score using 5 neighbors, 
the standardized bias is .360 and 1 observation is off the common support. 
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the effect is increased and the standard error decreased. The latter can be explained by the 
larger sample size. If studying each duration interval separately, however, it appears that 
the effect is only significantly positive in the sixth duration interval. 
    When using 5 neighbors, the sample size also allows for dividing the displaced into 
displaced due to downsizing and plant closure, respectively. Propensity scores are 
estimated separately for each group of displaced.




    For employment, the effect on the risk of exiting displacement is significantly negative 
for both groups of displaced. The effect of displacement is, however, much larger for the 
displaced due to plant closure as compared to downsizing. This result may reflect that the 
outside options are not as bad for those where the plant is not closed, which is reasonable 
based on the fact that the business and potential contacts still exist. It may also reflect a 
larger share of voluntary quits among the displaced due to downsizing, which was 
discussed as a potential concern in Section 4.2. For unemployment, the effect is non-
significantly negative for plant closures and significantly positive for downsizing. Based 
on the theoretical framework, this should be interpreted as there being a selection of self-
employed among those displaced due to downsizing but not among those displaced due 
to plant closure. It is reasonable to believe that the previous result of a significantly 
positive effect on the hazard using five neighbors is driven by the displaced due to 
downsizing. Once more, the effect is only significant in the sixth duration interval. 
    The unmatched sample is used as a further robustness check. Two specifications are 
considered, one with all controls in Table 1 included and one with only municipality and 
industry controls. For employment, the result is indeed similar to the baseline result. The 
estimated coefficient is -.25 and -.26, with and without personal controls. The result 
                                                 
22 A Caliper of 0.01 is used in the estimation of the propensity scores. For plant closures, there are no 
differences in covariate means, the standardized bias is 0.701 and 2 observations are off  the common 
support. The share of balanced covariates is above 86 percent for all middle 8 deciles. For downsizing, 
there are no differences in covariate means, the standardized bias is 0.370 and no observations are off the 
common support. 
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suggests that the effect on survival is robust to which controls are included and how they 
are included. Including personal controls in the specification using the matched sample 
does not affect the result either. This is reasonable based on the effect of displacement 
being assumed to reflect worse outside options, which should be unobservable and not 
driven by personal controls. It also indicates that worse outside options rather than a 
smaller propensity to incorporate drive the results, since propensity to incorporate is 
arguably correlated with personal characteristics. For unemployment, the risk of exiting 
is insignificantly increased in the matched sample for both specifications. When 
including personal controls in the matched sample, the effect is insignificantly decreased. 
The latter result might suggest that due to selection, the displaced fail to a larger extent 
but after controlling for the selection, there is instead a small negative effect. The 
negative effect might be explained by higher motivation. However, the effect is obviously 
small and insignificant. Finally, the Weibull model is used to parametrize the hazard (the 
logarithm of survival is included instead of a duration interval dummy). In the model, the 
sign and magnitude of the effects are unaffected as compared to the baseline results. 
    In sum, the robustness results support the baseline results and suggest that the risk of 
exiting self-employment for employment is decreased by displacement, while the risk of 
exiting to unemployment is unaffected. That the risk of exiting to unemployment is larger 
for the displaced due to downsizing in one duration interval cannot be regarded as 
evidence of an effect of displacement on exits to unemployment. This is particularly true 
regarding the uncertainty associated with those displaced due to downsizing, the 
uncertainty for duration intervals after 1990 and a potentially larger bias when 
considering 5 instead of 1 neighbor in the matching. 
 
 
6   Concluding remarks 
 
The results suggest that displacement in connection with entry decreases the hazard and 
hence, increases the time in self-employment. When considering different exit states, the 
result robustly indicates that displacement decreases the probability of exiting to 
employment. The interpretation of the result is that worse outside options imply that 
displaced individuals remain longer in self-employment. Displaced individuals seem to 
consider self-employment as their new means of subsistence rather than as a transitory 
state. Based on the baseline results (Figure 2), roughly four out of ten displaced self-
employed leave self-employment during the first year as compared to five out of ten of 
the non-displaced. This difference is not only statistically significant but also of 
economic importance. No effect of displacement can be pronounced for exits to 
unemployment and inactivity. While no conclusions for inactivity can be drawn from this 
result due to problems in the empirical analysis, the result for the unemployment exit 
state does suggest that no effect on the risk of exiting to unemployment exists, or, at least, 
that it is very small. In sum, it is evident that as a consequence of previous displacement, 
individuals choose to remain longer in self-employment, while no clear evidence of a 
mechanism pushing the displaced involuntarily out of self-employment is found. The 
results should be interpreted with some caution based on potential biases, in particular 
those associated with incorrect specifications of the exit states and the estimation of the   21
self-employment status in 1990. Although all robustness tests do indicate that the results 
are not driven by these shortcomings, some discretion is appropriate. 
    The non-existing effect for the exit state unemployment implies that the paper provides 
no evidence in favor of displaced individuals failing in self-employment to a larger 
extent. This result suggests that the increased failure rate for unemployed individuals 
obtained by Carrasco (1999) and Johansson (2000), reflects selection rather than a lower 
reservation wage due to being job-less.     
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Appendix: 
 
A Definition of the length of the closure process 
 
     
The exact definition of the length of the closure process is given below. For an 
establishment closed in year t:   
 
    Definition 1 
    The closing process was three years if 
    a) the number of employees in t-3 was 50 or more, and 
    b) there was a reduction of the workforce, between both t-3 and t-2, and between t-2       
and t-1, of at least 20 percent. 
     
 
 
    Definition 2 
    The closing process was two years if 
    a) the closing process was not three years according to Definition 1, 
    b) the number of employees in t-2 was 25 or more, 
    c) there was a reduction of the workforce, between t-2 and t-1, of at least 10 
employees, and 
    d) the reduction corresponds to at least 20 percent of the workforce. 